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Abstract 
The human urge to represent the three-dimensional world using two-dimensional pictorial 
representations dates back at least to Paleolithic times. Artists from ancient to modern 
times have struggled to understand how a few contours or color patches on a flat surface 
can induce mental representations of a three-dimensional scene. This article summarizes 
some of the recent breakthroughs in scientifically understanding how the brain sees that 
shed light on these struggles. These breakthroughs illustrate how various artists have 
intuitively understand paradoxical properties about how the brain sees, and have used that 
understanding to create great art. These paradoxical properties arise from how the brain 
forms the units of conscious visual perception; namely, representations of three-
dimensional boundaries and surfaces. Boundaries and surfaces are computed in parallel 
cortical processing streams that obey computationally complementary properties. These 
streams interact at multiple levels to overcome their complementary weaknesses and to 
transform their complementary properties into consistent percepts. The article describes 
how properties of complementary consistency have guided the creation of many great 
works of art. 
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1. Introduction 
Many painters have struggled to understand how we see a 3D world, and to express their 
insights on flat canvases or other 2D surfaces. Cavanagh (2005) has noted that 
“discrepancies between the real world and the world depicted by artists reveal as much 
about the brain within us as the artist reveals about the world around us” (p. 307). This 
article will summarize how the insights of various artists reflect different organizational 
principles about how the brain sees. The article does not, however, focus on discrepancies 
between the real world and the world depicted by artists. Rather, I summarize brain 
organizational principles and mechanisms that reflect different artistic efforts. A recent 
cortical model of how the brain sees clarifies these organizational principles and 
mechanisms and enables the nature of artists’ struggles to be clearly articulated.  
The foundational model is called the FACADE model, or Form-And-Color-And-
DEpth model, of 3D vision and figure-ground perception (Grossberg, 1987b, 1994, 1997; 
Grossberg and McLoughlin, 1997; Grossberg and Pessoa, 1998; Kelly and Grossberg, 
2000; McLoughlin and Grossberg, 1998). More recently, the FACADE model has been 
further developed as the 3D LAMINART model to show how the layered circuits of 
visual cortex realize processes of 3D vision and figure-ground perception, and to thereby 
explain and predict even more perceptual and brain data (Cao and Grossberg, 2005; 
Grossberg, 1999; Grossberg and Howe, 2003; Grossberg and Swaminathan, 2004; 
Grossberg and Yazdanbakhsh, 2005) 
My discussion will address aspects of the following basic question that needs to 
be answered whenever one considers painting: Why can brain designs that represent the 
3D world of our daily experience also respond to 2D pictures with conscious 3D 
representations of what the pictures depict? Without this brain capacity, the world of 
pictorial art, whether expressed by paintings, movies, or TV, could not exist. This is a 
huge topic, and I will only sample some highlights here. Before turning to artistic 
examples, I will ground my discussion with some basic discoveries from the FACADE 
and 3D LAMINART models about how the brain sees. 
2. Complementary Computing of Boundaries and Surfaces 
What are the perceptual units that are used by the brain to build visible percepts? Our 
modeling work predicted in the mid-1980s (Grossberg, 1984; Cohen and Grossberg, 
1984; Grossberg and Mingolla, 1985a, 1985b; Grossberg and Todorovic, 1988), and 
many subsequent experiments have supported, the claim that boundaries and surfaces are 
the brain’s perceptual units, notably 3D boundaries and surfaces. Although this seems 
like a simple enough answer, actually it represented a radical break with previous views 
of visual perception.  
This was a radical break because it is part of a major paradigm shift in 
understanding how the brain works. It also introduced into vision some conclusions 
which seem shocking to the non-specialist, because the properties of boundaries and 
surfaces are far from obvious. These shocking conclusions reflect, moreover, just the 
sorts of issues with which artists have had to cope to make great paintings. 
The new paradigm is what I have called complementary computing (Grossberg, 
2000). Complementary computing contradicts the previously popular hypothesis that the 
brain sees by using independent modules. The notion of independent modules tried to 
deal with the realization that visual properties (e.g., form, color, motion, depth) require 
specialized processes to be computed. Many scientists therefore proposed that our brains 
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possess independent modules, as in a digital computer, to process these different 
properties. The brain’s organization into distinct anatomical areas and processing streams 
supports the idea that brain processing is specialized. However, specialization does not 
imply independence. Independent modules should be able to fully compute a property 
like form, color, motion, or depth on its own. Unfortunately, this is not true: During 
visual perception, strong interactions are known to occur between perceptual qualities 
(e.g., Egusa, 1983; Faubert and von Grunau, 1995; Kanizsa, 1974; Pessoa et al., 1996; 
Smallman and McKee, 1995). In particular, form and motion can interact, as can 
brightness and depth, among other combinations of qualities.  
This mutual dependence of perceived properties is one of the hardest things for 
vision scientists to explain. It is also one of the hardest things for an artist to embody in a 
painting. I know at least one plein air artist who has said that if, while she is painting a 
scene, a car drives into the scene and parks, then she has to start painting the scene all 
over again. This artist’s comment vividly illustrates that specialization does not imply 
independence.  
Figure 1 
Cortical anatomy shows that there exist several processing streams in the visual brain 
(DeYoe and van Essen, 1988), and these streams have been assumed to carry out 
specialized processing, such as form, color, motion, and depth processing (Figure 1). 
However, even at the cortical level, the simple view of independent modules is not 
supported. Indeed, cells in different streams often share many properties in common. 
Complementary computing clarifies this situation by asserting that certain pairs of 
processing streams compute complementary properties, indeed that boundaries and 
surfaces are computed in complementary streams, with the LGN-(V1 interblob)-(V2 
interstripe)-V4 stream computing boundaries, and the LGN-(V1 blob)-(V2 thin stripe)-
V4 stream computing surfaces. The ability of cells in one stream to compute one sort of 
property (e.g., a perceptual boundary) prevents it, in principle, from computing a 
complementary property (e.g., a perceptual surface). The streams need to interact at 
multiple stages of processing to overcome their complementary weaknesses. A 
neurophysiologist who records a cell in one stream would therefore have considerable 
difficulty separating properties that are computed directly in that stream from properties 
that are projected to the stream from cells in the complementary stream.  
The hyphenated name Form-And-Color-And-DEpth (FACADE) attempts to 
express the fundamental fact that the perceptual qualities of form, color, and depth can 
mutually influence one another, and that these properties are multiplexed at individual 
cells within the visual cortex. The name FACADE also expresses the idea that, due to this 
interaction, we can understand how the world looks vividly “real” without falling into the 
trap of Naïve Realism. 
Figure 2 
Some of the shocking conclusions about boundaries and surfaces include the following. 
Suppose that you are asked: “Why do we bother to see?” You might very well answer: 
“We see things in order to recognize them.” However, it is easy show that this claim is 
false, by providing a counterexample to it. In Figure 2a, the vertical boundary that forms 
between the offset gratings of horizontal lines is consciously recognized, but not visibly 
seen. However, if we can recognize things without seeing them, then why do we see?  
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Figure 2a shows that “some boundaries are invisible.” Actually, in a sense that is 
clarified below, “all boundaries are invisible,” at least within the boundary stream. 
Visibility is a property of the complementary surface stream. Some of the other surprising 
conclusions of this sort of analysis include: All line ends are illusions. Continuous 
boundaries form discontinuously. Some surface colors are invisible. And, as an answer to 
the question of why we see, if not to recognize: Visible surface colors are used for 
reaching. 
Before going on, you might express the concern: “This may be interesting, but 
what does it have to do with painting?” I claim that, in fact, a core struggle of great artists 
such as Matisse, the Impressionists and many other plein air painters concerned artistic 
implications of the fact that “all boundaries are invisible.”  
3. All Boundaries are Invisible 
Perceptual boundaries are also called groupings. They take many forms (see Figure 3), 
but all of these forms have begun to be explained as the outcome of a single type of 
perceptual grouping process. Figures 4a and 4b illustrate some grouping properties using 
illusory contour percepts of Kanizsa squares. We see boundaries forming inwardly 
between cooperating pairs of incomplete disk (pac man) inducers to form the square’s 
sides. These boundaries are oriented collinearly between like-oriented inducers.  
Figure 3 
The square boundary in Figure 4b can be both seen and recognized because of the 
enhanced illusory brightness of the Kanizsa square. The square boundary in Figure 4a can 
be recognized even though it cannot be seen; that is, there is no brightness or color 
difference on either side of the boundary. Figure 4b shows that some boundaries can be 
recognized even though they are invisible. Our recent vision models predict that all 
boundaries are amodal, or invisible, within the boundary stream.  
Figure 4 
The boundary in Figure 4a is invisible because its vertical boundaries form between black 
and white inducers that possess opposite contrast polarity on the gray background. The 
same is true of the boundary around the gray square in Figure 4c. Figure 4c illustrates 
how, by pooling signals from opposite contrast polarities at each position, the brain can 
build a boundary around the entire square, even though it lies in front of a textured 
background whose contrasts with respect to the square reverse along the boundary. The 
brain does this by pooling opposite contrast polarity signals at every boundary position. 
Pooling of opposite polarities renders the boundary system output insensitive to contrast 
polarity. The boundary stream cannot represent visible colors or brightnesses, because its 
outputs cannot signal the difference between dark and light. In summary, “all boundaries 
are invisible” to enable the visual cortex to build boundaries around objects as a key step 
in object recognition. 
 If boundaries are invisible, then how do we see anything? The FACADE and 3D 
LAMINART models predict that visible properties of a scene are represented by the 
surface processing stream. A key step in representing a visible surface is called filling-in. 
Why does a surface filling-in process occur? An early stage of surface processing 
compensates for variable illumination, or “discounts the illuminant,” in order to prevent 
illuminant variations, which can change from moment to moment, from distorting all 
percepts. Discounting the illuminant attenuates color and brightness signals except near 
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regions of sufficiently rapid surface change, such as edges or texture gradients, which are 
relatively uncontaminated by illuminant variations. Later stages of surface formation fill 
in the attenuated regions with these relatively uncontaminated color and brightness 
signals, and do so at the correct relative depths from the observer through a process called 
surface capture. One struggle that many artists face is how to represent surface colors 
“out there in the world,” even though all they can consciously see are the results of 
discounting the illuminant within their own brains. 
 Figure 4d shows an example of surface filling-in that is called neon color 
spreading (Grossberg and Mingolla, 1985a; Van Tuijl, 1975). Filling-in spreads 
outwardly from the individual blue inducers in all directions. Its spread is thus 
unoriented. The FACADE and 3D LAMINART models predict that signals from the 
boundary stream to the surface stream define the regions within which filling-in is 
restricted. Without these boundary signals, filling-in would dissipate across space, and no 
visible surface percept could form. Filling-in can lead to visible percepts because it is 
sensitive to contrast polarity. The complementary properties of boundary completion and 
surface filling-in are summarized in Figure 4. 
4. Matisse Realized that All Boundaries are Invisible 
Invisible boundaries indirectly assure their own visibility through their interactions with 
the surface stream. Within the surface stream, boundaries trigger the filling-in of 
lightness and color within their contours, and restrict the spreading of lightness and color 
to the surface region that they bound. In addition, the same visual stimuli activate both 
the boundary and the surface streams, in parallel. Thus, a visual scene or painting 
activates both the boundary and the surface streams in parallel, the boundary stream 
generates an emergent perceptual grouping, and this grouping controls the filling-in of 
potentially visible surface lightnesses and colors within the surface stream. These facts 
about brain processing have influenced the creative struggles and decisions of many 
artists. 
In particular, every artist faces the choice of whether to actually draw the 
boundaries around the surfaces that his or her painting will represent, or to allow the 
brain to create these boundaries through the process of amodal perceptual grouping, as it 
does in response to the images in Figure 3. Figure 3b is particularly instructive, because it 
illustrates how the brain can respond to a spatially discrete pattern of 2D texture elements 
with a 3D representation of a smooth surface.  
Figure 5 
Matisse, among others, struggled with this issue for many years. Later in his life, when 
his health led him to work with paper cut outs, he wrote about “the external conflict 
between drawing and color…Instead of drawing an outline and filling in the color…I am 
drawing directly in color” (Matisse, 1947/1992). Matisse was already “drawing directly 
in color” in his paintings from the Fauve period, as illustrated in his painting from 1905 
called The Roofs of Collioure (Figure 5). Matisse realized instinctively that, if he painted 
directly with appropriately shaped color patches, these patches would induce the 
formation of amodal boundaries within the brain of the viewer. These boundaries, in turn, 
would capture the inducing colors to form the surface representations of color and form 
that enable the viewer to understand the painting (Figure 6). 
Figure 6 
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How does “drawing directly in color” change how a painting looks? If instead of drawing 
directly in color, Matisse drew visible contours around his surfaces, and did so in a dark 
color, then these contours could darken the surface colors of the entire scene, via a 
process of color assimilation. Color assimilation occurs due to mechanisms whereby 
boundaries control the filling-in of surface color. See Kelly and Grossberg (2000) for an 
explanation of how this can happen. Matisse, however, wanted to create bright, glowing 
surface colors, which were a goal of the entire Fauve movement to which he belonged. 
He therefore figured out how to prevent the darkening and other distorting effects of 
visibly drawn contours, without preventing a viewer from perceiving the surface 
representations that are needed to understand his paintings. An intuitive understanding of 
the fact that “all boundaries are invisible” was one result of this struggle. 
 A striking example of color assimilation due to visible contours is the watercolor 
illusion of Pinna (Figure 7). Pinna and Grossberg (2005) have explained this variant of 
color assimilation using the competition that occurs between nearby boundaries when one 
boundary is stronger than the other. The stronger boundary is induced by a larger contrast 
in the scene. A stronger boundary can inhibit a nearby weaker boundary more than 
conversely. The color that the weaker boundary would otherwise contain can then 
partially spread, and be assimilated, into the contiguous surface. 
Figure 7 
5. The Impressionists and the Cape Cod School of Art 
Many other artists have also struggled with how to represent object surfaces without 
drawing explicit boundaries around them, including the leading members of the Cape 
Cod school of art, Charles Hawthorne (Hawthorne, 1938/1960) and his most famous 
student, Henry Hensche (Hensche, 1988; Robichaux, 1997). The Cape Cod school 
championed painting en plein air and was thus especially concerned with representing the 
vivid colors of natural scenes. Their statements below, which were aimed at teaching the 
art of seeing and painting, reflect some of the same themes that concerned Matisse. 
Hawthorne (1938/1960) wrote: “Beauty in art is the delicious notes of color one against 
the other…all we have to do is to get the color notes in their proper relation” (p. 18). 
“…put down spots of color…the outline and size of each spot of color against every other 
spot of color it touches, is the only kind of drawing you need bother about…Let color 
make form—do not make form and color it. Forget about drawing…” (pp. 25-26). “You 
don’t hear me say much about drawing. It is because I think drawing the form, and 
painting, are better separated. The first thing is to learn to see color” (pp. 41-42). Hensche 
further developed these concepts and put them into a historical context in which Monet 
played a pivotal role: “When Monet came along…he revolutionized the ‘art of seeing.’ 
…it was the method of expressing light in color, and not value, to allow the key of nature 
to show clearly…The landscape helped Monet determine how color expressing the light 
key was the first ingredient in a painting, not drawing” (Robichaux, p. 27). “The 
untrained eye is fooled to think he sees forms by the model edges, not with color…Fool 
the eye into seeing form without edges” (Robichaux, p. 31). “Every form change must be 
a color change” (Robichaux, p. 33). 
6. Surface Filling-In of Impressionist Paintings and SAR Images 
Although the Impressionists pioneered an enhanced understanding of the role of color in 
painting, each painter expressed this insight in a unique way. We are all aware of how 
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Impressionist paintings of such artists as Monet can perceptually disintegrate into 
meaningless jumbles of color spots as they are approached and their individual color 
elements become more visible, yet when viewed from a sufficient distance are organized 
by the brain into vibrant colored surfaces that have a clear and often exquisite scenic 
meaning.  
The role of amodal emergent boundaries is critical in being able to make sense of 
an Impressionist painting, notably the fact that boundaries form more vigorously in 
response to statistically significant distributions of contrast and color across space. As in 
the case of the watercolor illusion, the stronger boundaries inhibit weaker boundaries that 
would otherwise form. Boundary sensitivity to statistical groupings of contrast and color 
is needed to form percepts of an Impressionist painting because the painted surface is 
often densely covered with small spots of color. Surviving boundaries group together 
statistically significant combinations of these contrast and color spots to generate a form-
sensitive plexus of boundaries, or boundary web (Grossberg, 1987a; Grossberg and 
Mingolla, 1987; Grossberg, Kuhlmann, and Mingolla, 2006; Pinna and Grossberg, 2005). 
Then the colors fill-in within the compartments of the boundary web, mixing within each 
compartment.  
Figure 8 
A similar effect can be seen when the LAMINART vision model processes images that 
are derived from an artificial sensor, such as Synthetic Aperture Radar, or SAR. In a SAR 
image, there is a great deal of granularity in the input image, much as in an Impressionist 
painting. Figure 8 illustrates a SAR simulation from Mingolla, Ross, and Grossberg 
(1999). Figure 8a is the input image, which contains five orders of magnitude in the SAR 
power return. This image would look entirely black were it not for some image 
enhancement due to the reproduction process. Figure 8b shows the image after it has been 
normalized without saturating its relative contrasts. This contrast normalization property 
is a result of discounting the illuminant. Here the granularity, or pointilistic nature, of the 
image is evident. Figure 8c shows the emergent boundaries that are derived from the 
contrast-normalized image, and Figure 8d shows the filled-in surface representation, 
which shows a top-down view of a country scene in which a bridge crosses a highway in 
an area filled with trees and grass. Figure 8d is created when the contrast-normalized 
input to the surface stream in Figure 8b is gated by the boundaries in Figure 8c and 
thereupon fills-in until it hits a boundary. This happens within multiple scales of 
processing that are all lumped together in Figure 8. In contrast to the granularity in Figure 
8b, the surface representation of Figure 8d exhibits smoothly shaded forms. The 
conversion from granular texture to smooth form derives from the use of boundary-gated 
filling-in to smooth over input differences within each boundary compartment, and to 
differentiate inputs between boundary components, much as the brain does in response to 
an Impressionist painting. 
7. 2D Image to 3D Percept: Multiple Scales, Binocular Disparity, Chiaroscuro, and 
Perspective 
The ability of amodal boundary webs to group together statistically regular combinations 
of contrast and color also helps to explain the percept that is generated by the image in 
Figure 3b. Two basic problems must be solved for the brain to achieve this result: (1) 
Patterns of spatially discrete 2D texture elements need to be transformed into a spatially smooth 
surface representation of 3D shape. (2) Changes in the statistical properties of texture elements 
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across space need to induce corresponding changes in the perceived 3D shape of this surface 
representation. This can be achieved by the FACADE model when multiple filters of 
different orientation preference and spatial size, or scale, process the 2D image. Several 
filters can respond to the same texture features, but in different ways. Filter orientation 
and size determine what properties of the texture can be detected by each filter.  
Why are there multiple filter sizes? This is because the brain needs to construct 
cells that are sensitive to different binocular disparities. Binocular disparity describes the 
positional differences of an object’s projections on an observer’s left and right retinas, 
and is a strong cue for perceiving depth of objects that are at sufficiently near depths 
(Howard and Rogers, 2002; Julesz, 1971; Tyler, 2004). For distant objects, monocular 
cues, such as T-junctions, may be used to determine relative depth when one object is 
nearer than another object, and occludes parts of the farther object (Howard and Rogers, 
2002). Occlusion can also elicit strong 3D percepts when we view 2D images (Figure 9). 
In addition to being perceived at a farther depth, the visible parts of an occluded object 
are often perceptually linked together behind the occluder by amodal boundary and 
surface representations (Grossberg, 1994). 
Figure 9 
For the moment, we concentrate on the fact that bigger scales can more easily compute 
larger binocular disparities than smaller scales, other things being equal, although bigger 
scales can also compute a larger range of disparities than smaller scales. It is also often 
the case that objects tend to subtend a larger region of the retina, and to create larger 
binocular disparities, when they are closer to an observer than when they are far away. 
This tendency for larger scales to represent nearer objects is called the size-disparity 
correlation (Julesz and Schumer, 1981; Kuffler, 1978; Prince et al., 2002; Prince and 
Eagle, 1999; Richards and Kaye, 1974; Schor and Tyler, 1981; Schor and Wood, 1983; 
Schor et al., 1984; Smallman and MacLeod, 1994; Tyler, 1975, 1983). The differential 
activation of multiple scales occurs in response to 2D pictures as well as to 3D scenes, 
which clarifies how pictures can represent the 3D world. It needs to be emphasized, 
however, that these multiple-scale filter activations are ambiguous if only because larger 
scales can represent a larger range of disparities than can smaller scales. Thus, multiple 
scales can be activated, but to different degrees, by objects at each depth. 
The FACADE model clarifies how this ambiguous multiple-scale representation 
of shape is disambiguated using cooperative and competitive boundary interactions 
(Grossberg, 1987b, 1994, 1997; Grossberg and Mingolla, 1987) that, in concert with 
scale-to-depth and depth-to-scale maps (Grossberg, 1994), carry out coherent perceptual 
groupings within depths. These maps link together all of the multiple-scale filters that can 
respond to the same narrow range of depths with a boundary representation that 
represents that depth range, and conversely. Across-depth competition helps to select the 
most strongly activated 3D boundary representations, while suppressing weaker boundary 
representations. These processes take place within multiple depth-selective boundary 
webs before the boundary representations regulate the filling-in of a smooth 3D surface 
representation that is what we see. Grossberg, Kuhlmann, and Mingolla (2006) used these 
ideas to quantitatively simulate challenging percepts and data about 3D shape-from-
texture, including percepts such as the one in Figure 3b.  
3D shape-from-shading can also be explained by similar mechanisms, except that, 
with a shaded image, the inducers of the boundary web are not separated in space. The 
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percept of blue columns bulging in 3D space that is derived from viewing Figure 7 can be 
explained using these mechanisms, as can the related percept of the blue regions as being 
the “figures” of the image, and the white regions the “background” (Pinna and Grossberg, 
2005). Indeed, the painterly technique of chiaroscuro, whereby a skillful use of light and 
dark paints create the illusion of 3D shape, achieves the illusion of a bulging 3D figure 
instead of the actual 2D painted surface. Leonardo da Vinci was one of the first painters 
to master the chiaroscuro technique, whose creation of a 3D percept may also be 
explained by how differentially activated multiple-scale filters give rise to a 3D boundary 
web that captures surface color at different depths.  
The same sorts of multiple-scale boundary representations can be used to explain 
how perspective in a 2D picture can generate a 3D percept of increasing depth (Figure 
9b), as has been used with great effect since the time of Renaissance painters. The bigger 
scales, other things being equal, create a percept of a nearer surface, while the smaller 
scales create a percept of a surface that is farther away. The ambiguity in the multiple-
scale representation must here too be eliminated by scale-to-depth and depth-to-scale 
maps, cooperative-competitive boundary interactions, and the filling-in of slanted surface 
representations. How the brain fills-in percepts of surfaces that are slanted in depth was 
first simulated in Grossberg and Swaminathan (2004). 
Figure 10 
Chiaroscuro, perspective, and T-junctions are all employed in the Mona Lisa of Leonardo 
da Vinci, each contributing in its own way create the 3D appearance of the figure and to 
project it in front of the landscape background (Figure 10). The chiaroscuro and 
perspective effects can be explained in the manner summarized above. Let us briefly 
consider how T-junctions help to create a percept of a figure in front of its background. 
Here again the complementarity of boundaries and surfaces plays an important role. 
8. Bipole Cells, T-junctions, Figure-Ground Perception, and Pictorial Depth 
First, we need to briefly summarize theoretical and experimental evidence for how 
perceptual boundaries are formed, and how they are completed in response to pictures 
and scenes with spatially separated inducers, as in Figure 3. Perceptual boundaries, or 
groupings, may be formed by cells in layer 2/3 of cortical area V2, among other places. 
Long-range excitatory connections exist among the cells in this layer, and provide an 
anatomical substrate for forming perceptual groupings, including the illusory contours of 
the Kanizsa square, as well as the groupings which represent ecologically important 
scenic cues such as shading, texture, and depth (Figure 3). These connections tend to 
exist between cells which are tuned to the similar orientational preferences that are 
aligned, or co-linear, across space. Left to themselves, these excitatory connections could 
lead to an uncontrollable spread of excitation across the cortex.  
Figure 11 
In addition to the long-range excitatory connections, there are shorter-range inhibitory 
connections. These inhibitory connections are activated by the excitatory connections and 
also terminate on the cells that send out the long-range excitatory connections (Figure 
11). This inhibition is balanced against the excitation in order to realize a property for 
perceptual grouping that I have called the bipole property (Cohen and Grossberg, 1984; 
Grossberg, 1984; Grossberg and Mingolla, 1985a, 1985b) A cell that obeys the bipole 
property can fire if it gets approximately co-linear excitatory inputs from approximately 
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co-oriented cells on both sides of its receptive field, even if it does not directly receive a 
bottom-up input. This is what happens, for example, when an illusory contour is formed 
in response to a Kanizsa square (Figure 3a). A bipole cell can also fire in response to a 
bottom-up input alone. This can happen, for example, when a bipole cell is directly 
activated by an oriented contrast, such as a short edge in a picture or scene. Finally, a 
bipole cell can respond to a bottom-up input plus any combination of long-range signals 
from nearby bipole cells. This is what happens, for example, in response to the extended 
contours of the pac men figures in Figure 3a that induce the illusory contour: The direct 
input comes from the oriented contrast at the location of the bipole cell, while additional 
inputs come from the cells that respond to other positions on the pac men.  
The bipole property allows perceptual boundaries to form inwardly between pairs 
or greater numbers of inducers, as in the Kanizsa square of Figure 3a, but not outwardly 
from individual inducers, which would allow boundaries to form uncontrollably from 
individual specks of contrast in a scene. This balance of excitation and inhibition is also 
important during cortical development: Without the balanced inhibitory interactions, the 
growth of the long-range excitatory connections during development could proliferate 
uncontrollably if inhibition were too weak, or could be suppressed entirely if inhibition 
were too strong; see Grossberg and Williamson (2001) for model simulations. 
Cortical cells with the bipole property were discovered at around the same time 
that we predicted them. Cells with these properties were reported in cortical area V2 of 
monkeys in the classical experiments of von der Heydt, Peterhans, and Baumgartner 
(1984) and in subsequent experiments from this laboratory; e.g., Peterhans and von der 
Heydt (1989). Later psychophysical experiments have also supported this receptive field 
structure; e.g., Field, Hayes, and Hess (1993) and Kellman and Shipley (1991). See 
Grossberg (2003) for a review of additional experimental evidence about bipole cells. 
Figure 12 
Bipole cells do not respond only to their preferred orientation and positions. Due to the 
manner in which they develop from visual experience, they receive excitatory 
connections from a range of positions that are close to their preferred co-linear locations, 
and also from a range of orientations that are close to their preferred orientation. 
Likewise, inhibition is received from a range of positions near the bipole, and acts 
particularly strongly on orientations other than their preferred orientation (Figure 12). 
These basic bipole properties enable the brain to react to T-junctions in a scene or picture. 
 Consider the inputs received by bipole cells where the top of the T in Figure 12 
meets its stem. The bipole cells whose orientation preference is co-linear with the T top 
receive excitatory inputs from both sides of the T top. In contrast, the bipole cells whose 
orientation preference is co-linear with the T stem receive excitatory inputs from only 
one side of the T stem. The more active bipole cells at the T top can therefore inhibit the 
bipole cells along the T stem more than conversely. The inhibition along the T stem can 
completely inhibit boundary cells along the T stem at locations near the T top.  
This break in the boundary is called an end-gap. The end-gap allows lightness and 
color signals to flow out of the figural region that would otherwise have been formed by 
the T stem. This flow of color initiates the separation of figures from their background, 
and tends to push the background to a perceived depth that is farther away than the 
figure. This happens due to feedback interactions between the boundary and surface 
streams that help to create a consistent percept in response to the complementary 
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properties of the boundary and surface streams (Figure 13). I call this property 
complementary consistency.  
Figure 13 
For present purposes, I consider only the question of whether there is any direct evidence 
that competing boundaries can create end-gaps, that lightness and color can flow through 
these gaps, and that such a flow can influence figure-ground percepts? Neon color 
spreading provides an excellent classical example of how boundaries can create end-gaps 
and how color can flow through these gaps. In response to the image in Figure 4d, for 
example, the end-gaps form at the positions where the black and blue lines join. 
Grossberg and Mingolla (1985a) provided the first explanation of how this happens, and 
Grossberg (1994) provided the first explanation of how 3D percepts of neon can occur. 
Recent experiments have shown how a lightness or color flow through an end-gap can 
trigger a figure-ground percept, while also influencing perceived lightness or color 
(Dresp et al., 2002; Tse, 2005). Several articles explain how this may happen (Grossberg, 
1997; Grossberg and Yazdanbakhsh, 2005; Kelly and Grossberg, 2000). Pinna and 
Grossberg (2005) explain how neon color spreading and the watercolor illusion (Figure 
7) may be given a unified explanation. 
These conclusions provide some comfort to those who reasonably worry how the 
brain can embody competences, like figure-ground separation, that might otherwise seem 
too difficult to be discovered by Darwinian selection during brain evolution. FACADE 
theory provides an explanation of figure-ground separation that uses processes which 
seem much simpler than figure-ground perception itself. In other words, figure-ground 
perception may now be understood as an emergent property of simple processes. One key 
process is the way in which bipole cells form perceptual groupings. The balance between 
excitation and inhibition that realizes the bipole property also enables end-gaps to form at 
T-junctions. In addition, simple feedback interactions between the boundary and surface 
streams help to create consistent percepts in response to complementary properties (see 
Grossberg, 1997). 
9. Equiluminance and Undulating Percepts 
Great painters used a wide range of insights about how the brain sees to paint effective 
works of art. Monet, for example, created some paintings in which adjoining areas of the 
painting are almost equiluminant, such as his paintings called Impression:Sunrise 
(http://webexhibits.org/colorart/monet.html) and Near Argenteuil (see Figure 14 and 
http://webexhibits.org/colorart/monet2.html). The former painting can create the 
impression of sun undulating in the sky, and the latter can create the impression of red 
poppies quivering in a green field. The concept of equiluminance illustrates another 
aspect of boundary/surface complementarity.  
Figure 14 
Within the boundary stream, indeed already at complex cells of cortical area V1, an early 
stage of boundary formation (see Figure 13b), inputs are pooled over opposite contrast 
polarities and all opponent colors as part of the process of computing good boundary 
signals. The data of Thorell, DeValois, and Albrecht (1984) support this claim. Their 
important article reported data from macaque monkey that showed that “simple 
cells…are distinguished by relatively narrow color specificity” (p. 761). In contrast, 
“complex color cells…responded uniformly to many (or, in the extreme, all) 
equiluminant wavelength changes…The RFs of many of these cells…were composed of 
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overlapping color-regions” (p. 762). The pooling process at complex cells helps to build 
boundaries from essentially all sources of achromatic and chromatic contrastive signals 
that the brain can compute. Such pooling is also the basis for the prediction that “all 
boundaries are invisible,” since light-dark and dark-light contrasts are pooled, as well as 
red-green, green-red, blue-yellow, and yellow-blue contrasts. It is of historical interest 
that Thorell et al. (1984) did not draw this conclusion. Instead, they asserted that complex 
cells “must surely be considered color cells in the broadest sense. They clearly use color 
information to detect the presence of spatial patterns” (p. 768). FACADE theory claims 
that complex cells are not color cells. Rather, they are boundary cells which, at least 
within the boundary stream, do not give rise to any visible color percept. In order to see, 
the surface stream does not lump all of these signals together. Rather, it elaborates them 
into separate opponent and double-opponent achromatic and chromatic channels that are 
the basis of visible achromatic and chromatic surface percepts. 
When adjoining regions of a painting are equiluminant, then many of the 
contrastive signals that input to complex cells at the region boundaries are either zero or 
very small. If they were all zero, then there would be no boundary, and lightness and 
color would spread across both regions by filling-in and cancel out as in the Ganzfeld. 
This does not happen because the balance point of all the opponent pairs of signals (e.g., 
light-dark vs. dark-light, red-green vs. green-red, blue-yellow vs. yellow-blue) are not 
identical. However, at equiluminance, boundaries are weak and therefore labile. 
Boundary lability is, I claim, one factor that contributes to the impression of an 
undulating sun and quivering poppies.  
Using opponent colors such as red and green at both sides of a boundary 
facilitates this effect, because equiluminance can then more easily be balanced across the 
several channels that contribute to the boundary, thereby creating a particularly weak 
boundary between the opponent colored regions. 
10. Opponent Colors, Antagonistic Rebound, and Balance 
Why are there opponent colors in the first place, with all their implications for color 
contrast in paintings? To explore this issue fully would take us beyond the scope of this 
article, but some comments can be made. A clue about how to think about this is that 
opponent colors can lead to negative aftereffects. For example, after one views a red 
patch of color for awhile, if one looks at a white piece of paper, a green aftereffect is 
experienced. Such an aftereffect is an example of an antagonist rebound; that is, offset of 
cells that code red causes an antagonist rebound of activation in the opponent cells that 
code green. 
Opponent colors are not the only features that have an opponent organization and 
that experience antagonistic rebounds. If one observes an image for awhile with lines 
radiating like spokes of a wheel from a central point, and then looks at a blank white 
piece of paper, an antagonistic rebound occurs in which lines perpendicular to the spokes 
appear and seem to be organized in concentric circles. This is the MacKay illusion. If one 
looks at water running downward for awhile and then looks at a blank white piece of 
paper, an antagonistic rebound occurs in which motion seems to be moving upward. This 
is the Waterfall illusion. In addition to antagonistic rebounds in vision, they occur in 
many other brain systems. For example, offset of a sustained fearful cue can elicit a wave 
of relief, whereas removal of a desired food can elicit a wave of frustration. Why do 
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opponent processes exist throughout the brain, and what functional role does antagonistic 
rebound play? 
My colleagues and I have been developing Adaptive Resonance Theory, or ART, 
to explain such phenomena for the past thirty years; e.g., Grossberg (1976, 1978, 1980, 
1984, 1991) and Carpenter and Grossberg (1991, 1993). ART clarifies another type of 
complementary computing in the brain. This one has to do with how the brain balances 
between expected vs. unexpected events, or familiar vs. unfamiliar events. ART shows 
how this balance enables the brain to learn quickly about a changing world without 
experiencing catastrophic forgetting. 
Within ART, antagonistic rebounds play an important role in causing the rapid 
and context-sensitive reset of brain states in response to changing inputs. Such a reset 
process helps to rebalance sensory, cognitive, emotional, and motoric representations in 
response to rapidly changing environmental inputs, and to thereby enable the brain to 
response to new information in as unbiased a way as possible. When there is a mismatch 
between a learned expectation and a visual or other sensory cue, reset can also drive a 
memory search for more appropriate learned categories with which to represent the 
unexpected or unfamiliar event.  
The opponent processing circuits in which such antagonistic rebounds occur are 
called gated dipoles. Gated dipoles also seem to represent all brain circuits where on-cells 
(cells activated by the original input) and off-cells (cells activated by the antagonistic 
rebound) coexist, and where offset of a previously active on-cell can cause an 
antagonistic rebound that activates the corresponding off-cell. Gated dipoles have been 
used to explain a wide variety of behaviors about animal and human cognitive-emotional 
learning and decision-making. See Grossberg (2000) and Grossberg and Seidman (2006) 
for how imbalanced gated dipoles may contribute to schizophrenia and autism, 
respectively. 
In summary, even the seemingly relatively simple phenomenon of opponent 
colors reflects a general brain design that embodies a type of complementary computing. 
Tipping the balance between opponent colors can tend to cause aftereffects that can 
influence the percepts that we see, both in the world and in paintings. 
8. Concluding Remarks: Complementarity and Art 
This article indicates how a variety of artists, including Renaissance painters, Fauvists, 
Impressionists, and members of the Cape Cod School of painting, have developed an 
artistic understanding of rather deep properties of how the brain sees. Their insights 
included an intuitive understanding of the complementary properties of 3D perceptual 
boundaries and surfaces.  
All of these artists seemed to understand that a given spot of contrast or color in a 
picture can activate both the cortical boundary stream and the cortical surface stream in 
parallel, before these streams process their shared inputs in complementary ways. Some 
artists, such as Fauve painters like Matisse, and Cape Cod School artists like Hawthorne 
and Hensche, exploited the fact that “all boundaries are invisible” to “paint in color.” 
They thereby created luminous surface color percepts, without the darkening effects of 
explicit edges. Other artists, such as Impressionists like Monet, exploited the fact that 
perceptual boundaries sense the statistical distribution of color spots to create the frames 
within which lightness and color flow, and thereby mix colors, to generate perceived 
surface form and color.  
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Artists since the Renaissance understood how to use perspective cues to generate 
a percept of depth by exploiting the different reactions of oriented filters of different size, 
whose differential activation of depth-selective boundaries can create depthful boundary 
and surface percepts in much the same way as a 3D scene does. These artists also 
understood how T-junctions can separate figures from their backgrounds. However, they 
could not understand that the same bipole cell receptive fields that create perceptual 
groupings are also sensitive to T-junctions, and can trigger the initial steps of figure-
ground perception that are completed by feedback between the boundary and surface 
streams that ensures complementary consistency. Insights about equiluminant boundaries 
and how they can influence color percepts, and about the organization of opponent 
colors, with their attendant antagonistic rebounds, also reflect the complementary 
organization of the brain. In this sense, many artists can be viewed as masters of how the 
brain achieves complementary consistency, and with it the balance that radiates from 
many of the greatest works of art. 
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Figure 1  
Figure 1. Schematic diagram of anatomical connections and neuronal selectivities of 
early visual processing areas in the macaque monkey. The LGN Parvo-(V1 Interblob)-
(V2 Interstripe)-V4 stream is predicted to compute perceptual boundaries. The LGN 
Parvo-(V1 Blob)-(V2 Thin Stripe)-V4 stream is predicted to compute perceptual 
surfaces. LGN = lateral geniculate nucleus (parvocellular [parvo] and magnocellular 
[magno] divisions). Divisions of visual areas VI and V2: blob = cytochrome oxidase blob 
regions, interblob = cytochrome oxidase-poor regions surrounding the blobs, 4B = lamina 
4B, thin = thin (narrow) cytochrome oxidase strips, interstripe = cytochrome oxidase-
poor regions between the thin and thick stripes, thick = thick (wide) cytochrome oxidase 
strips, V3 = Visual Area 3, V4 = Visual Area(s) 4, and MT = middle temporal area. Areas 
V2, V3, V4, and MT have connections to other areas not explicitly represented here. Area 
V1 4B
V2 Thick
MT
V3
Parietal 
 Areas
V2
V1
InterstripeV2Thin
V1 InterblobBlob
V4
Inferotemporal 
        Areas
    WHAT                          WHERE
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V3 may also receive projections from V2 interstripes or thin stripes. Heavy lines indicate 
robust primary connections, and thin lines indicate weaker, more variable connections. 
Dotted lines represent observed connections that require additional verification. Icons: 
rainbow = tuned and/or opponent wavelength selectivity (incidence at least 40%), angle 
symbol = orientation selectivity (incidence at least 20%), spectacles = binocular disparity 
selectivity and/or strong binocular interactions (V2; incidence at least 20%), and right-
pointing arrow = direction of motion selectivity (incidence at least 20%). [Adapted with 
permission from “Concurrent processing streams in monkey visual cortex,” by E. A. 
DeYoe and D. C. van Essen, 1988, Trends in Neurosciences, II, p. 223. Copyright 1988 
by Elsevier Science.] 
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Figure 2 
Figure 2. (a) The offset black horizontal lines induce a percept of a vertical boundary that 
can be recognized even though it does not generate a visible brightness or color 
difference. (b) The circular illusory boundary of the Ehrenstein disk is visible because it 
induces an illusory brightness difference between the disk and its surround.  
a b 
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Figure 3 
Figure 3. Examples of perceptual grouping: (1) an illusory square emerges from the four 
pace men to be seen as the well-known Kanizsa square. (b) a discrete texture in a 2D 
picture can generate a percept of a continuous 3D surface by differentially activating 
multiple-scales of boundary webs. (c) colinear lines can pop-out from a field of randomly 
oriented lines by being linked by an emergent boundary. (d) an emergent boundary can 
separate the figure of the zebra from the background. T-junctions between the zebra and 
the background can help to push the background behind the zebra figure. See text for 
further discussion. 
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Figure 4 
Figure 4. (a) opposite-contrast Kanizsa square shows that opposite contrast polarities can 
group together, as well as same contrast polarities, and that both sorts of groupings are 
b 
d 
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oriented 
inward 
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SURFACE FILLING-IN 
 
unoriented 
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part of the same boundary completion process. Because two pac men are darker than the 
background gray, and the other two are lighter than the background gray, they induce 
lightening and darkening effects that cancel out, thereby creating an invisible, or amodal, 
Kanizsa square that is recognized but not seen. (b) same-contrast Kanizsa square is 
visible because all four black pac men induce brightness signals within the square that 
creates a brighter square after surface filling-in. (c) pooling of opposite contrast along the 
square borders illustrates how the brain can build an object boundary around a textured 
background and thus why “all boundaries are invisible.” (d) neon color spreading vividly 
illustrates the computationally complementary properties of boundary completion and 
surface filling-in that are summarized at the bottom of the figure. 
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Figure 5 
Figure 5. The Roofs of Collioure was painted by Matisse in 1905.  
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Figure 6 
Figure 6. The Roofs of Collioure in Figure 5 illustrates how Matisse “paints in color” 
without using explicitly drawn edges that could darken the painting’s perceived colors. 
These color patches generate amodal boundaries that can capture the surface colors into 
surface percepts that have a meaning to viewers.  
 
amodal 
boundaries 
surface  
colors 
color patches 
on canvas 
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Figure 7  
Figure 7. The columns bulge in the 3D space even if they appear softly and nebulously 
colored. [Reprinted with permission from Pinna and Grossberg (2005).] 
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Figure 8 
Figure 8. Processing of a Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) image by the boundary 
completion and surface filling-in mechanisms: (a) unprocessed SAR imagine of upstate 
New York scene consisting of a highway with bride overpass in a wooded area with 
grass. This image represents five orders of magnitude of power in the radar return. It 
would look almost entirely black were it not for enhancement due to figure reproduction. 
It also includes a lot of multiplicative noise and sparse high-intensity pixels. (b) the 
contrast-normalized image due to “discounting the illuminant.” (c) the boundary 
representation that is generated in response to the image in (b), after responses of 
boundary
input feature 
filling-in 
a b 
c d 
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multiple boundary scales are combined. (d) the filled-in surface representation after the 
results of multiple filling-in events are pooled in response to the multiple boundary 
scales. Note that the “pointilistic” nature of the image in (b) is now replaced by smoothly 
defined surface forms. [Reprinted with permission from Mingolla, Ross, and Grossberg 
(1999).] 
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Figure 9 
Figure 9. (a) The horizontal bar typically appears to lie in front of a partially occluded 
vertical bar that is amodally completed behind it. (b) Where only one vertical bar exists. 
its upper horizontal edge still seems to belong to the horizontal bar. This property of 
“border ownership” can be explained by how bipole cells break the boundary where a T-
junction stem joined a T-junction top. Such end-cuts are predicted to initiate figure-
ground separation. (c) the corridor illusion: Due to the spatial gradients within the figure, 
the smaller pasrallelograms look further away than the larger ones. Correspondingly, the 
upper cylinder looks larger than the lower cylinder, although both cylinders are the same 
size. [Reprinted with permission form From Sight and Mind: An Introduction to Visual 
Perception by L. Kaufman. 1974. New York: Oxford University Press. Copyright 1974 
by Oxford University Press.]  
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Figure 10 
Figure 10. The Mona Lisa of Leonardo da Vinci, circa 1503 – 1507, contains exquisite 
examples of chiaroscuro to create a percept of a 3D shape in the subject, and of multiple 
scales and T-junctions, among other factors, to create the impression of a background at a 
greater distance.  
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Figure 11 
Figure 11. Schematic of the boundary grouping circuit in cortical layer 2/3. Pyramidal 
cells with colinear, coaxial receptive fields (shown as ovals) excite each other via long-
range horizontal axons (Bosking et al., 1997; Schmidt et al., 1997), which also give rise 
to short-range, disynaptic inhibition via pools of interneurons, shown filled-in black 
(McGuire et al., 1991). This balance of excitation and inhibition helps to implement the 
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boundary 
representation 
stimulus 
layer 2/3 
boundary 
representation 
stimulus 
b 
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bipole property. (a) Illustration of how horizontal input coming in from just one side is 
insufficient to cause above threshold excitation in a pyramidal cell (henceforth referred to 
as the target) whose receptive field does not itself receive any bottom-up input. The 
inducing stimulus (e.g., a Kanizsa ‘pacman’) excites the oriented receptive fields of layer 
2/3 cells, which send out long-range horizontal excitation onto the target pyramidal. This 
excitation brings with it a commensurate amount of disynaptic inhibition. This balance of 
“one-against-one” prevents the target pyramidal cell from being excited above-threshold. 
The boundary representation of the solitary pacman inducer produces only weak, sub-
threshold colinear extensions (thin dashed lines). (b) When two colinearly aligned 
inducer stimuli are present, one on each side of the target pyramidal cell receptive field, a 
boundary grouping can form. Long-range excitatory inputs fall onto the cell from both 
sides, and summate. However, these inputs fall onto a shared pool of inhibitory 
interneurons, which, as well as inhibiting the target pyramidal, also inhibit each other 
(Tamas et al., 1998), thus normalizing the total amount of inhibition emanating from the 
interneuron pool, without any individual interneuron saturating. The combination of 
summating excitation and normalizing inhibition together create a case of “two against-
one”, and the target pyramidal is excited above-threshold. This process occurs along the 
whole boundary grouping, which thereby becomes represented by a line of 
suprathreshold-activated layer 2/3 cells (thick dotted line). Boundary strength scales in a 
graded analog manner with the strength of the inducing signals. [Reprinted with 
permission from Grossberg and Raizada (2000).]  
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Figure 12 
Figure 12, T-Junction Sensitivity: (a) T-junction in an image. (b) Bipole cells provide 
long-range cooperation (+), and work together with inhibitory interneurons that provide 
cells provide short-range competition (-). (c) An end-gap in the vertical boundary arises 
because, for cells near where the top and stem of the T come together, the top of the T 
activates bipole cells along the top of the T more than bipole cells are activated along the 
T stem. As a result the stem boundary gets inhibited whereas the top boundary does not. 
[Reprinted with permission from Grossberg (1997).]  
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Figure 13 a 
Figure 13. (a) 3D LAMINART macrocircuit. It illustrates the interactions between 
model components Retina/LGN and cortical areas V1, V2, and V4. 
a 
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Figure 13 b 
Figure 13. (b) Model circuit diagram. The model consists of a boundary stream that 
includes V1 interblobs, V2 pale stripes, and part of V4, and computes 3D perceptual 
groupings in different scales; and a surface stream that includes V1 blobs, V2 thin stripes, 
and part of V4, and computes 3D surfaces that are infused with lightnesses in depth. 
These two streams both receive illuminant-discounted signals from Retina/LGN cells, 
and interact with each other to overcome their complementary deficiencies and create 
consistent 3D boundary and surface percepts, in the cortical area V4. Also, 3D boundary 
and surface representations formed in the pale stripes and thin stripes of cortical area V2, 
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respectively, are amodally completed, and provide neural support for the object 
recognition process in the inferotemporal cortex.  
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Figure 14 
Figure 14. In the painting Near Argenteuil by Monet, 1973, the red poppies and the green 
field are painted to be almost equiluminant (at least in the original painting). This creates 
weak boundaries between them and facilitates an occasional impression of the boundaries 
moving in a country breeze.  
 
 
